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The Problem of De Se Attitudes 
An Introduction to the Issues and the Essays 
NEIL FEIT AND ALESSANDRO CAPONE 
If Smith says ‘I am hungry’, then she makes a de se assertion and expresses 
a de se belief, that is, an assertion and a belief that are irreducibly about the 
way she herself is. If Jones says ‘Smith believes that she herself is hungry’, 
he attributes a de se belief to Smith. More generally, de se attitudes are 
those that we express with ‘I’ or other first-person pronouns, and those that 
we attribute to others with emphatic reflexives such as ‘she herself’ and ‘he 
himself’ (and with certain other constructions where appropriate). De se 
attitudes do not merely lurk at the margins of our psychology and our dis-
course about it, they are everywhere. And yet they raise challenging prob-
lems concerning the nature of the content of our attitudes, and the proper 
analysis of belief reports and other attitude attributions. This volume col-
lects together new essays, by linguists and philosophers, examining these 
problems. Although the division is to a certain extent arbitrary, the book is 
divided into two parts: the first has to do with a cluster of issues in linguis-
tics and the philosophy of language, and the second with issues in the epis-
temology and metaphysics of attitude content. In this introduction, we dis-
cuss the problem of de se attitudes and several of the classic papers devoted 
to it, and so we hope that this book might serve as a stand-alone volume on 
the topic.  
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1 The Problem of De Se Attitudes 
There are at least two interconnected problems associated with de se atti-
tudes. One of them is a semantic, or broadly linguistic, problem. Consider 
the following: 
(1) Obama believes that Obama is tall.  
(2) Obama believes that the president of the USA is tall. 
(3) Obama believes that he is tall. 
(4) Obama believes that he himself is tall. 
Suppose that Obama is suffering from temporary amnesia, so that in 
some ordinary sense he does not realize that he is Obama, does not realize 
that he is the president of the USA, and does not realize that he is tall. Sup-
pose also that, while amnesic, Obama looks at a photograph of a group of 
people, among them a tall man who is identified by the caption as Barack 
Obama, the president of the USA.  
In the imagined scenario, utterances of (1) and (2) would be true. But an 
utterance of (4) would clearly not be true. Moreover, while it might be the 
case that an utterance of (3) has a reading on which it is equivalent to an 
utterance of (4), that is, a de se reading, such a reading is not obligatory 
even in cases where ‘he’ is anaphoric to the subject, ‘Obama’. For example, 
in uttering (3) a speaker might be reporting that Obama has a belief about a 
certain man, who, unbeknownst to Obama happens to be Obama himself – 
and in virtue of looking at the photograph, he does indeed have such a be-
lief. So, there is at least a sense in which (3) also does not entail (4). The 
non-entailment goes the other way as well. We can imagine scenarios in 
which (4) is true, but in which (1), (2), and (3) on its non-de se reading are 
false. The main linguistic problem, then, is to account for the semantic dif-
ference between de se attitude reports like (4), on the one hand, and reports 
like (1)-(3) on the other.  
One way to summarize this problem is to ask: How does the meaning of 
an emphatic reflexive like ‘he himself’ in the complement of an attitude 
report differ from that of a co-referential proper name, definite description, 
or pronoun? (A related problem, or perhaps a different face of the same 
problem, concerns the difference in meaning between the first person pro-
noun and other co-referential terms.) The problem is challenging for several 
reasons, perhaps the strongest being the fact that whatever we take the 
realm of meanings of subject terms to be, it would seem to be exhausted by 
the meanings we assign to proper names, definite descriptions, and pro-
nouns. If this is the case, then it seems there is nothing else the emphatic 
reflexive can mean. 
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The linguistic problem of de se attitudes just sketched is sharpest when 
set within a particular framework for belief, which will set the stage for the 
psychological version of the problem. (Indeed some would argue that in the 
absence of such a framework, de se attitudes do not constitute a problem at 
all.) According to this framework, a cognitive attitude such as belief is a 
two-place relation between a subject and a proposition, the truth or false-
hood of which does not vary from person to person or from time to time. 
When such a relation is instantiated, the relevant proposition is the content 
of the attitude.  
With this framework in mind, let’s reconsider (4) above: 
(4) Obama believes that he himself is tall. 
The framework of propositional attitudes, unless it is adorned with addi-
tional machinery, cannot easily make sense of the belief that is attributed to 
Obama in an utterance of (4). This is because it seems plausible that Obama 
could believe the proposition that Obama is tall without believing that he 
himself is tall. He might, as in the amnesia example above, fail to realize 
that he himself is Obama. Moreover, it is plausible that for any property F, 
Obama could believe the proposition that the F is tall without believing that 
he himself is tall. He might not believe that he himself is the one and only 
individual who has F, for example, even if he is that individual. Every can-
didate for content available on the framework seems to misrepresent or fail 
to pin down the content of Obama’s belief. 
To summarize the main psychological problem: if Obama does not real-
ize that he himself is Obama, then he can believe de se that he is tall without 
believing that Obama is tall; and if he does not realize that he himself is the 
F, for any property F, then he can believe de se that he is tall without be-
lieving that the F is tall. As a result, it seems that Obama’s de se belief can-
not be identified with any belief of the form x is tall, where x is any name or 
definite description that designates Obama, and so his belief must have a 
different content than any belief of that form. The problem, in general, is to 
identify the content of a given de se belief and thereby distinguish it from 
beliefs that are not de se. 
Before turning to some classic discussions of de se attitudes in the liter-
ature, we would like briefly to consider one more problem about de se be-
lief. This problem is probably the first to be explicitly posed, by Peter 
Geach (1957). Geach formulates it like this: “if we say of a number of peo-
ple that each of them believes that he himself is clever, what belief exactly 
are we attributing to all of them? Certainly they do not all believe the same 
proposition, as ‘proposition’ is commonly understood by philosophers” 
(1957: 23). The imagined belief report seems to attribute the same belief to 
each of the people, and certainly the predicate ‘believes that he himself is 
clever’ is true of each of them. But the intuitive sense in which different 
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people can share the same de se belief seems difficult to capture, especially 
given the propositional framework discussed above. 
2 Some Classic Sources on De Se Attitudes 
2.1 Castañeda 
In the middle to late 1960s, Hector-Neri Castañeda published a series of 
papers focusing on the use of indexicals and demonstratives in attitude re-
ports, and in particular focusing on attributions of self-knowledge and other 
de se attitudes. In his seminal 1966 paper, ‘“He”: A Study in the Logic of 
Self-Consciousness’, Castañeda discusses uses of the pronominal ‘he’ in 
attributions of self-knowledge, which normally have the following linguistic 
structure: S knows that she herself (he himself) is F. Castañeda introduces 
the term ‘he*’ – a so-called quasi indicator – to abbreviate ‘he’ as it occurs 
in attributions of self-knowledge and the like, which he labels “the S-use of 
‘he’” (1966: 130). ‘He*’ thus disambiguates ‘he’, identifying the cases in 
which a de se reading is required. So, for example, Castañeda would render 
(4) above, and the de se reading of (3), as follows: 
(5) Obama believes that he* is tall. 
Using several clever and engaging examples, Castañeda forcefully ar-
gues that ‘he*’ is an essential indexical in that it cannot be replaced in an 
attribution like (5) by any of the following: (a) a pronominal that refers to 
Obama, (b) a description that denotes Obama, (c) a proper name for Obama, 
(d) a deictic, (e) the pronominal ‘I’. What should be emphasized, and what 
is perhaps most important to Castañeda’s project, is that in attributions of de 
se attitudes ‘he*’ cannot be replaced with a definite description or with a 
demonstrative pronoun. 
Let’s take a look at one of Castañeda’s own examples. Consider (6) be-
low: 
(6) The Editor of Soul knows that he* is a millionaire. 
In an utterance of (6), the token of ‘he*’ is not a proxy for the description 
‘the Editor of Soul’. To show this, Castañeda imagines the following: “The 
Editor of Soul may know that he himself is a millionaire while failing to 
know that he himself is the Editor of Soul, because, say, he believes that the 
Editor of Soul is poverty-stricken Richard Penniless” (1966: 134-35). So, 
the Editor of Soul can believe that he himself is a millionaire without be-
lieving that the Editor of Soul is a millionaire. The converse entailment also 
fails. “To see this,” writes Castañeda, “suppose that on January 15, 1965, 
the man just appointed to the Editorship of Soul does not yet know of his 
appointment, and that he has read a probated will by which an eccentric 
businessman bequeathed several millions to the man who happens to be the 
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Editor of Soul on that day” (1966: 135). Here, the Editor believes that the 
Editor of Soul is a millionaire, but does not believe that he himself is. 
Analogously, we should not be inclined to use (7) below, or (8) with a 
deictic use of ‘he’, to express (6): 
(7) The Editor of Soul knows that this man is a millionaire. 
(8) The Editor of Soul knows that he is a millionaire. 
In one of Castañeda’s examples (1966: 130), the Editor of Soul knows 
something about the man whose photograph lies on a certain table, but he 
does not know that he himself is the man in the photograph. In such a case, 
we can imagine the Editor looking at himself in the photograph, assenting to 
‘This man is a millionaire’ and ‘He is a millionaire’, but failing to be dis-
posed to assent to ‘I am a millionaire’. (We could also imagine the case 
with a mirror instead of a photograph.) It is clear that a speaker can utter (7) 
or (8), making reference to the Editor of Soul, without also committing her-
self to (6). So, ‘he*’ as it occurs in (6) cannot be replaced with ‘this man’ or 
with the deictic ‘he’. Neither (7) nor (8) entails (6). The extension of 
Castañeda’s reasoning to similar conclusions about proper names and genu-
ine pronominals is straightforward. 
With respect to the linguistic problem of de se attitudes, Castañeda uses 
these considerations to motivate the view that occurrences of ‘he*’ are 
“unanalyzable; they constitute a peculiar and irreducible mechanism of ref-
erence to persons” (1968: 447). The idea is that ‘he*’ cannot be analyzed, 
even partly, in terms of the semantics associated with definite descriptions, 
demonstratives, other pronouns, and the like. (Strictly speaking, only occur-
rences of ‘he*’ that Castañeda labels degree 1 are unanalyzable. In certain 
iterated attitude attributions, there are occurrences of higher degree. How-
ever, these are analyzed partly in terms of degree 1 occurrences, and so eve-
ry attribution of a de se attitude will have at least one unanalyzable occur-
rence of ‘he*’.) 
Castañeda’s early account addresses the problem of de se attitudes, but 
it leaves several questions unanswered. We will not go into much detail 
here, but it is plausible to attribute to him a broadly Fregean view of the 
workings of ‘I’ and ‘he*’. Some support for this comes from the following: 
[W]hen Privatus asserts “The Editor of Soul believes that he* is a million-
aire”, Privatus does not attribute to the Editor the possession of any way of 
referring to himself aside from his ability to use the pronoun ‘I’ or his abil-
ity to be conscious of himself. The latter ability is the only way of referring 
to himself that Privatus must attribute to the Editor for his statement to be 
true. (1966: 138) 
This and other passages seem to suggest that each person grasps a special 
sense, a special first-personal mode of referring to himself. When the Editor 
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of Soul says ‘I am a millionaire’, the pronoun ‘I’ expresses the Editor’s spe-
cial first-personal sense. When Privatus says ‘The Editor of Soul knows that 
he* is a millionaire’, the reflexive pronoun ‘he*’ expresses a sense such that 
the reference of this sense is the Editor’s special first-personal sense.  
This sort of view solves the linguistic problem of de se belief from 
within the framework of propositions – in particular, within the framework 
of the view that belief and other cognitive attitudes are simply two-place 
relations between conscious subjects and propositions. It distinguishes at-
tributions of self-knowledge (and de se attributions more generally) from 
others by postulating a class of special senses associated with the pronoun 
‘I’, every one of which differs from the senses of co-referential terms that 
do not contain ‘I’. Reference is made to such senses by devices like ‘he*’ 
when they occur in the complement sentences of attitude reports. 
This sort of view solves the psychological problem by identifying the 
sort of proposition to which a given subject is related when she has a de se 
attitude. We cannot express a proposition of this sort by uttering a sentence 
that contains a proper name or definite description (that does not itself con-
tain a first person pronoun), but it was wrong to look to such propositions 
for a solution to the problem. The content of a de se attitude is simply a 
proposition that one would express if one were to say ‘I am such-and-such’, 
which is constituted by the speaker’s special first-personal sense. One might 
object that this sort of view cannot solve Geach’s problem of shared de se 
belief, since – in virtue of a difference in reference – the belief that the Edi-
tor of Soul expresses by saying ‘I am a millionaire’ is a different proposition 
than the belief that Obama expresses by saying ‘I am a millionaire’. But 
perhaps good sense might be made of the idea that, although the two propo-
sitions are different, they are tokens of the same type of proposition, which 
accounts for the intuitive sameness of the beliefs.1 
2.2 Perry 
In his extremely insightful and influential 1979 paper ‘The Problem of the 
Essential Indexical’, John Perry presents the case of the messy shopper. 
Like Castañeda’s examples, this case poses a challenge for the view that 
belief is irreducibly a two-place relation between a conscious subject and a 
proposition. Perry describes the example as follows: 
I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart 
down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back along the aisle on the 
other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making a 
mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I 
seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I 
was trying to catch. (1979: 3) 
                                                            
1 For an excellent exposition and critical discussion of Castañeda’s work, see Perry (1983). 
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The challenge is to pick out two propositions: first, the one Perry be-
lieved before the truth dawned on him (the content of the belief he would 
have expressed by saying something like ‘The shopper who left this trail of 
sugar is making a mess’); and second, the one he later comes to believe (the 
content of the belief he would express by saying ‘I am making a mess’). 
Perry makes this need more vivid by noting that the second belief has a spe-
cial sort of motivational force. It explains a change in his behavior, a change 
that the first belief cannot even partly explain: 
I believed at the outset that the shopper with a torn sack was making a 
mess. And I was right. But I did not believe that I was making a mess. That 
seems to be something I came to believe. And when I came to believe that, 
I stopped following the trail around the counter, and rearranged the torn 
sack in my cart. (1979: 3) 
We explain why Perry stopped to rearrange the bag of sugar in part by 
conveying information about the relevant change in his beliefs. Since the 
change in belief explains his behavior, it seems that we must be able to 
provide the propositions to give an account of the change. However, as we 
have already seen, identifying the proposition that Perry believes when he 
finally says ‘I am making a mess’, is not a trivial task. The argument lurk-
ing around the case of the messy shopper, then, is something like this. Alt-
hough the change in Perry’s behavior is partly explained by his acquiring a 
new belief, there is no proposition such that Perry’s coming to believe it 
even partly explains the change. As a result, belief is not (or is not simply) a 
matter of a two-place relation between a believer and a proposition. 
Why think that there is no proposition such that his coming to believe it 
explains Perry’s behavior? Let’s note first that the use of ‘I’ or ‘he himself’ 
seems essential to explaining Perry’s behavior. For this reason, Perry (1979: 
8) claims that propositions lack an “indexical ingredient” that his belief 
must have, given its explanatory role. We have already touched on the rea-
soning here, in the discussion of the problem of de se belief. Consider the 
singular or purely descriptive propositions that a theory of propositions 
might have to offer. It seems that believing any one of them is consistent 
with lacking the de se belief that the explanation of Perry’s behavior re-
quires. 
Let’s take purely descriptive (non-singular, non-object dependent) 
propositions first. Suppose that we identify a purely descriptive proposition, 
P, and claim that Perry’s coming to believe P explains his clean-up behav-
ior. We know a bit about what P must be like, given that it is alleged to be 
both purely descriptive and the content of Perry’s de se belief that he him-
self is making a mess. Proposition P must somehow pick out Perry by 
means of some property (set of properties, uniquely satisfiable condition), 
and associate this with the concept or property of making a mess. So, for 
some property F, P is true if and only if exactly one thing has F, and what-
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ever has F is making a mess. In a nutshell, then, on the current proposal the 
belief that explains Perry’s clean-up behavior is his belief in the proposition 
that the F is making a mess. But it is extremely implausible that such a be-
lief could explain why he begins to clean up. Perry makes this point as fol-
lows: 
even if I was thinking of myself as, say, the only bearded philosopher in a 
Safeway store west of the Mississippi, the fact that I came to believe that 
the only such philosopher was making a mess explains my action only on 
the assumption that I believed that I was the only such philosopher, which 
brings in the indexical again. (1979: 8) 
The point here is that it seems quite clear that Perry could believe the 
proposition that the only bearded philosopher in a Safeway west of the Mis-
sissippi is making a mess without believing that he himself is making a 
mess, since he could fail to believe himself to be the only bearded philoso-
pher in a Safeway store west of the Mississippi. The same goes for any 
purely descriptive proposition. So, belief in such a proposition cannot play 
the explanatory role of Perry’s de se belief that he himself is making a mess. 
Can we say that what explains Perry’s behavior is his coming to believe 
a singular or object-dependent proposition, where truth conditions are not 
determined descriptively? For example, can we say that Perry’s clean-up 
behavior is explained by his coming to believe the singular proposition that 
Perry is making a mess? There are several reasons why this seems unsatis-
factory. First, the most common views according to which people believe 
singular propositions entail that Perry believed this proposition before the 
truth finally dawned on him. When he started following the trail of sugar, 
for example, he believed that the shopper who was leaving the trail was 
making a mess. Since he was this shopper, he had a belief about himself, to 
the effect that he was making a mess. This, on the most common views al-
lowing belief in singular propositions, means that he believed the proposi-
tion that Perry is making a mess. Even views on which it is more difficult to 
believe a singular proposition are in trouble here. This is because we can 
imagine that Perry perceived himself in some way and took the person he 
perceived to be making a mess, without believing that he himself was 
making one. In fact, Perry imagines just this: 
Suppose there were mirrors at either end of the counter so that as I pushed 
my cart down the aisle in pursuit I saw myself in the mirror. I take what I 
see to be the reflection of the messy shopper going up the aisle on the other 
side, not realizing that what I am really seeing is a reflection of a reflection 
of myself. I point and say, truly, “I believe that he is making a mess.” 
(1979: 12) 
Of course, if Perry believed the singular proposition that Perry is 
making a mess, and he believed it before the truth finally dawned on him, 
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then his coming to believe it cannot explain his clean-up behavior. Moreo-
ver, if following a person’s trail of sugar, or seeing him in a mirror, are suf-
ficient for believing a singular proposition, then someone with merely a 
third-person perspective on Perry could believe the singular proposition that 
Perry is making a mess. And if this is the case, Perry could believe this 
proposition without believing de se that he himself is making a mess. So 
belief in this proposition could not play the explanatory role of that de se 
belief.  
This brings us to what Perry calls “propositions of limited accessibility” 
(1979: 15-16). It seems that the attempt to explain Perry’s behavior in terms 
of his belief in the relevant singular proposition implies that only Perry 
could believe it, and in general, that any given person can believe proposi-
tions that no other person can believe. Perry gives some reasons to resist 
propositions of limited accessibility. Their relation to genuine de se belief is 
also less than fully clear. For example, why is it impossible for Perry to 
believe the proposition that Perry is making a mess without believing that 
he himself is making one? If Perry does not know who he is, it seems he 
could know exactly which individual is making a mess, and know every bit 
of information about this individual down to the last detail – and thereby, it 
seems, believe that Perry is making a mess – but not believe himself to be 
this individual.  
We have focused on the singular proposition that Perry is making a 
mess, but we will briefly consider another. For example, we might want to 
identify some token sensory or perceptual experience of Perry’s, call it ‘E’, 
and say that he believes the proposition that the subject of E is making a 
mess.2 This is a singular proposition about E, not Perry. In addition to shar-
ing some of the difficulties just discussed, there is good reason to think this 
suggestion lacks an important sort of psychological realism. Certainly, Per-
ry can think to himself ‘I am making a mess’ without identifying himself as 
the unique person who is having a particular experience. So, this sort of 
proposition is also ill-suited to play the explanatory role that Perry’s de se 
belief in fact plays. 
We might try to solve the problem along explicitly Fregean lines. When 
Frege discussed the sense of the word ‘I’, he maintained that “every one is 
presented to himself in a special and primitive way in which he is presented 
to no one else” (1918 [1988]: 42). Applied to Perry’s de se belief, this sug-
gests that the content is a proposition that only Perry could believe, in virtue 
of its containing a sense that only Perry could grasp. This in turn seems to 
suggest that the sense, or mode of presentation, does not contribute purely 
descriptive information to the proposition. (If the proposition were purely 
descriptive, we would have the problems for that view discussed above.) 
                                                            
2 Cf. Higginbotham (2003 [2009]). 
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So, on this account, what Perry believes is a proposition that contains his 
self concept – i.e., a non-qualitative mode of presentation that presents or 
determines Perry, but not in virtue of any descriptive fit – and the sense of 
‘is making a mess’. In addition to postulating first-person propositions, 
which Perry wishes to avoid,3 this strategy requires a clear account of non-
descriptive modes of presentation and how they determine subjects as their 
referents.   
We turn now to Perry’s solution to the puzzle. Perry makes a distinction 
between what he believed, and the belief state in virtue of which he be-
lieved it, one that led him to examine the sack of sugar in his cart, and one 
we might individuate by using the sentence ‘I am making a mess’. In the 
case of the messy shopper, what explains Perry’s clean-up behavior is his 
coming to be in this belief state. Before the truth dawned on him, Perry 
might have believed the proposition that Perry is making a mess, but only 
in virtue of being in a different belief state (perhaps one individuated by ‘He 
is making a mess’, if Perry had pointed to the man in the supermarket mir-
ror). What explains Perry’s behavior, then, is a change in his belief state, 
and not his coming to believe a new proposition. 
Perry’s account solves the psychological problem of de se belief by re-
jecting the presumption that we need to identify a proposition that can serve 
as de se content. On his view, this role is played by belief states rather than 
propositions. The account also gives an answer to Geach’s problem about 
shared de se belief. People who share de se beliefs are in the same belief 
state – for example, the belief state that might lead each one to say ‘I am 
clever’ – despite believing different propositions. Perry (1979) does not 
explicitly address the linguistic problem, but his view suggests an answer. A 
de se attribution of belief – such as an utterance of ‘Perry believes that he 
himself is making a mess’ – might be claimed to contain information not 
only about the alleged object of belief, but about the belief state as well. For 
example, it might contain the information that the belief state is one that is 
individuated by the sentence ‘I am making a mess’.4 
2.3 Lewis 
In his seminal 1979 paper ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’, David Lewis 
argues that the belief relation and, more generally, the relations that com-
prise our cognitive attitudes, relate us to properties instead of propositions. 
Properties are akin to what Perry (1979) calls relativized propositions, 
which are not true or false simpliciter but are true or false at-a-person (-and-
time). For example, the property of making a mess is true at, or true of, each 
                                                            
3 See also Perry (1977). 
4 See Richard (1983) for an account like this, which employs sentence-meanings instead of 
sentences.  
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person who is making a mess. Perry argued cogently that relativized propo-
sitions cannot serve as de se contents, but he presupposed the traditional 
conception of belief as something like inward assent to a proposition. Lew-
is, however, takes the belief relation to be in a way necessarily reflexive – 
to believe something is to take-yourself-to-have some property. He calls this 
relation self-ascription. So, for example, when Perry believes that he him-
self is making a mess, what he does is self-ascribe the property of making a 
mess.5 
Lewis uses the extraordinary case of the two gods to motivate his ac-
count: 
Consider the case of the two gods. They inhabit a certain possible world, 
and they know exactly which world it is. Therefore they know every propo-
sition that is true at their world. Insofar as knowledge is a propositional atti-
tude, they are omniscient. Still I can imagine them to suffer ignorance: nei-
ther one knows which of the two he is. They are not exactly alike. One 
lives on top of the tallest mountain and throws down manna; the other lives 
on top of the coldest mountain and throws down thunderbolts. Neither one 
knows whether he lives on the tallest mountain or on the coldest mountain; 
nor whether he throws manna or thunderbolts. (1979: 520-21) 
It does seem that the gods “inhabit a certain possible world,” i.e., that this is 
a metaphysically possible scenario. How could the gods suffer ignorance? 
Well, we can imagine that the gods always have qualitatively identical ex-
periences. Lewis suggests that the gods might lack the beliefs that they do 
because “they have an equally perfect view of every part of their world, and 
hence cannot identify the perspectives from which they view it” (1979: 
521). This seems possible, and if it were the case, then neither perspective 
would allow its subject to identify his own spatial location. Since the gods 
believe every proposition that is true at their world but could still truly be-
lieve more than they in fact do, the contents of the missing beliefs could not 
be propositions. They must instead be properties that the gods are unable to 
self-ascribe. It might seem plausible to think that if the content of a belief is 
not a proposition, then it is a property (or something very much like a prop-
erty). One way to have a true belief is to take yourself to have a property 
that you do in fact have. On Lewis’ view, if the god on the tallest mountain 
were somehow to come to believe that he himself lived on the tallest moun-
tain, his belief would consist in his self-ascribing the property of living on 
the tallest mountain. We have in this case a kind of “property ignorance” 
despite propositional omniscience. 
On Lewis’ account, the belief relation exhibits a kind of necessary re-
flexivity, and the verb ‘believes’ can roughly be paraphrased by ‘believes 
oneself to have’. The account is extended from de se belief to de se attitudes 
                                                            
5 Chisholm (1979, 1981) argues for and develops a view very close to that of Lewis. 
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in general. For example, the desire to be a millionaire is understood in terms 
of the subject bearing the appropriate cognitive relation – the analogue of 
self-ascription for desire – to the property of being a millionaire (of the sub-
ject’s wanting-to-have this property). Moreover, the account is also ex-
tended away from paradigm examples of de se attitudes, so that de dicto 
beliefs, for example, are also treated as self-ascriptions of properties. For 
instance, believing the proposition that all squares are rectangles is viewed 
as self-ascribing the corresponding property of being such that all squares 
are rectangles. So, de dicto attitudes are subsumed under de se ones. 
On the view proposed by Lewis, then, to have a cognitive attitude is to 
bear the psychologically appropriate relation to a property. To believe 
something is to self-ascribe a property, to desire something is to want-to-
have a property, and so on. The property is the content of the attitude. The 
content of Perry’s de se belief that he himself is making a mess, for exam-
ple, is simply the property of making a mess. There is no de se element, 
indexical ingredient, or self-concept in the content of the belief. What 
makes the attitude de se is built into the attitude instead of the content of the 
attitude. Here the attitude is self-ascription, and it is in virtue of self-
ascribing the property of making a mess that Perry’s belief is de se. 
Like Perry, Lewis solves the psychological problem of de se belief by 
rejecting the presumption that we need to identify a proposition that can 
serve as de se content. Unlike Perry, he retains the idea that belief is ulti-
mately analyzable in terms of a two-place relation. Lewis’ account also of-
fers a straightforward solution to Geach’s problem of shared de se belief. 
Every person who believes himself to be clever self-ascribes the property of 
being clever, and so all such people have beliefs with the very same content. 
The account provides the resources to solve the linguistic problem. 
Consider (1) and (4) from section 1 above, repeated here: 
(1) Obama believes that Obama is tall. 
(4) Obama believes that he himself is tall. 
Lewis can say that an utterance of (4) is true if and only if Obama self-
ascribes the property of being tall. The that-clause in (4) might be taken to 
denote this property.6 But (1) does not have Obama self-ascribing the prop-
erty of being tall. Instead, we might take an utterance of (1) to be true if and 
only if Obama self-ascribes the property of being such that Obama is tall. 
Lewis himself would take an utterance of (4) to assert that there is some 
relation of acquaintance R – looking at, reading about, remembering, look-
ing at a photograph of – such that Obama stands in R to Obama, and Obama 
self-ascribes the property of standing in R to someone who is tall.7 We can-
                                                            
6 See Chierchia (1989). 
7 The non-de se reading of (3) above receives the same treatment. 
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not go into these details here, but either way there is a semantic difference 
between (1) and (4). 
2.4 Stalnaker 
Robert Stalnaker, in his 1981 paper ‘Indexical Belief’, defends the idea that 
belief is simply a two-place relation between subjects and propositions from 
arguments based on cases of de se belief (and indexical belief more general-
ly). Like Lewis, Stalnaker takes propositions to be sets of worlds, but Stal-
naker rejects Lewis’ analysis of the case of the two gods. To get clear on 
Stalnaker’s view, it will be helpful to consider his analysis of this case. Re-
member that this is a case of ignorance of de se information, in that neither 
god knows his location in ordinary space. According to Stalnaker, if we 
suppose that the gods really are ignorant in this way, we must reject Lewis’ 
stipulation that they know every proposition that is true at their world. As 
Stalnaker sees it, the two gods case is 
a case of ignorance of which of two indiscernible possible worlds is actual. 
One of these possible worlds is the actual world (assuming that the theolo-
gian’s story is true), while the other is like it except that the god who is in 
fact on the tallest mountain is instead on the coldest mountain, with all the 
properties which the god on the coldest mountain in fact has. (1981: 143) 
Let’s call the world that Lewis describes ‘W’. Let’s also use ‘TM’ and 
‘CM’ as names for the god on the tallest mountain in W, and the god on the 
coldest mountain in W, respectively. According to Stalnaker, there is a 
world that is qualitatively exactly like W, but differs in that the gods have 
swapped places and properties. Let’s call this world ‘V’. So, in V, TM is on 
the coldest mountain and CM is on the tallest mountain. If TM is ignorant in 
W about his location, then he does not know which of W or V is actual. On 
Stalnaker’s view, then, he is ignorant of at least one proposition (one that is 
true at W but false at V). The upshot is Lewis cannot claim both that the 
gods are ignorant about their locations, and also that they are omniscient 
with respect to all propositions. 
Stalnaker’s account uses a doctrine called ‘haecceitism’ and a technique 
called ‘diagonalization’. Haecceitism, roughly, is the view that objects have 
non-qualitative essences, but do not have any qualitative properties essen-
tially. This allows TM to inhabit world V with all the qualitative properties 
and relations that CM has in W: living on the coldest mountain, throwing 
thunderbolts, and so on. What makes him TM there is his non-qualitative 
haecceity, the property of being TM. 
Diagonalization can be illustrated by considering the following sen-
tence: 
(9) I live on the tallest mountain. 
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In world W, an utterance of (9) by TM would express a proposition that is 
true at W but false at V, since his token of ‘I’ rigidly designates himself and 
he lives on the tallest mountain in W but not in V. In world V, too, an utter-
ance of (9) by TM would express a proposition that is true at W but false at 
V. Supposing that W and V are the only worlds relevant to attributing atti-
tudes to TM in the present context, we can form a matrix, or propositional 
concept, of (9) like this: 
 
 W V 
W T F 
V T F 
 
Here, the diagonal proposition is true at W but false at V. (The same 
goes for the horizontal propositions here, but we will soon see an example 
where they differ from the diagonal proposition.) According to Stalnaker, 
this diagonal proposition is the belief that TM would express by uttering a 
token of (9). It is the belief that we would attribute to TM if we were to say 
he believes that he himself lives on the tallest mountain. On Stalnaker’s 
view, if TM can distinguish W from V, he would know this proposition and 
hence know his location. In this way, Stalnaker argues that Lewis cannot 
assume both that TM knows he is in W rather than V, and that he is ignorant 
of his location. 
The example above might not make the point of diagonalization clear. 
So let’s consider another example. Suppose that in W, TM looks upon the 
world and somehow demonstrates the god on the tallest mountain, and 
while doing so utters a token of 
(10)  He lives on the tallest mountain. 
What belief does TM express? By diagonalizing, Stalnaker arrives at the 
result that the content of this belief is the proposition that contains both W 
and V. In W, TM’s utterance of (10) expresses a proposition that is true at W 
but false at V, since his token of ‘he’ rigidly designates TM, who lives on 
the tallest mountain in W but not in V. But his utterance of (10) occurs in V 
as well. In V, the utterance expresses a proposition that is true at V but false 
at W, since this token of ‘he’ rigidly designates CM, who lives on the tallest 
mountain in V but not in W. On this view, then, the content of the belief that 
TM expresses in uttering (10) is the diagonal proposition represented in the 
propositional concept below, which is true at W and V: 
 
 W V 
W T F 
V F T 
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Stalnaker thus objects to the two gods argument and defends the ade-
quacy of propositions as contents for indexical belief. Stalnaker puts it like 
this: “One cannot just stipulate that the god knows that he is in W and not in 
V, for on the proposed explanation, that amounts to the assumption that he 
knows which mountain he is on” (1981: 144). We might balk at the kind of 
haecceitism that is presupposed here. We might also wonder, with Lewis, 
how TM’s knowledge of the proposition containing W but not V gives him 
the de se knowledge that he himself is on the tallest mountain. We might 
think, for example, that TM’s knowing that TM rather than CM is on the 
tallest mountain would give TM the relevant de se knowledge only if he also 
knows that he himself is TM. But we shall not pursue these issues here.8 
Stalnaker’s view does provide a way of solving the problems of de se 
attitudes. On the linguistic side, Stalnaker accounts for the semantic differ-
ence between a de se attitude attribution and a non-de se attribution. (With 
the case of the two gods, we have been supposing that only possible worlds 
W and V need to be taken into account, which might be an over-
simplification. In general, context (broadly construed) will determine which 
possible worlds need to be countenanced.) An utterance of ‘TM believes 
that he himself is on the tallest mountain’, for example, would express (in 
the imagined context) the proposition that is true at W but not V. But an 
utterance of ‘TM believes that he is on the tallest mountain’, given a non-de 
se reading associated with TM’s utterance of (10), would express the diago-
nal proposition that is true at both W and V.9  
On the psychological side, Stalnaker holds that it is a mistake to think 
that no proposition adequately captures the content of a given de se attitude. 
In the context relevant to our discussion of the two gods case, for example, 
the proposition that is true at W but not V serves as the content of the de se 
information that TM lacks. In some sense, Stalnaker is reducing de se con-
tent to mere de re content, without the trappings of modes of presentation, 
guises, or the like.10 Perry’s de se belief that he himself is making a mess, 
for example, is true at a given world if Perry is making a mess there, and 
false otherwise (that is, if someone else is making a mess, or nobody is). 
This might give Stalnaker a way to approach Geach’s problem of shared de 
se belief – two people who intuitively have the same de se belief do not 
believe the same proposition, but each believes a proposition that depends 
for its truth on the very subject of belief, and not on whatever happens to 
satisfy some description or to be picked out by some mode of presentation. 
                                                            
8 See Lewis (1979), Stalnaker (1981) and Feit (2008: 34-42) for more discussion. 
9 See Stalnaker (1981) for a discussion of his treatment of attributions with the proper name of 
the subject in an embedded context, for example ‘Lingens believes that Lingens is a cousin of a 
spy’. An utterance of this sentence, via diagonalization, has Lingens believing a proposition 
that is true if and only if ‘Lingens is a cousin of a spy’ expresses a truth. 
10 See, for example, Higginbotham (2003 [2009]) for some discussion of this point. 
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This volume collects together sixteen new papers on de se attitudes. The 
papers in Part I deal primarily with issues concerning the linguistic problem 
of de se attitudes. The papers in Part II deal with issues concerning the psy-
chological problem, or with closely related issues concerning the nature of 
de se attitudes and their place in our psychological lives. In the next section, 
we present short summaries of the collected papers. 
3 Summaries of the Essays 
3.1 Part One: Linguistics and Philosophy of Language 
The problem of de se attitudes, according to Wayne Davis, is the problem of 
the essential indexical, an instance of Frege’s problem, as applied to ‘I’. It is 
both semantic (How does the meaning of ‘I’ differ from that of a coreferen-
tial proper name or definite description?) and psychological (How do the 
mental states we use ‘I’ to express differ from those we use coreferential 
names or descriptions to express?).  
In his contribution to this volume, Davis reviews the limitations of 
character, self-attribution, and event-subject analyses. He then sketches a 
solution within the general theory that words are conventional signs of men-
tal states, principally thoughts and concepts, and that meaning consists in 
their expression. On Davis’ view, indexicals express thought parts (“indexi-
cal concepts”) that are distinctive in the way they link to other mental 
events (“determinants”), either presentations or other concepts. Indexicals 
are distinguished in part by the pattern of uses they allow, which on his ac-
count are differentiated principally by determinants.  Used deictically, ‘I’ 
expresses the speaker’s self-concept, whose determinant is the speaker’s 
introspective self-awareness. De se attitudes are those whose objects con-
tain the subject’s self-concept. 
In his contribution, James Higginbotham begins by considering the 
view he defended on the issue of the first person pronoun. This view ap-
peals to Donald Davidson’s hypothetical event position (extending it to all 
predications, not just action sentences). On Higginbotham’s view, we 
should say that a speaker using the first person refers to him/her self as the 
speaker s(u) of his/her very utterance u (this view was earlier suggested in 
passing by John Perry). Under that circumstance, it makes no sense for one 
to ask of oneself, “But is it I who am speaking?” (modulo a couple of con-
cessions in other work). This view requires giving up the idea that the con-
tent of a person’s belief, as reported in ‘John believes that p’ can be proper-
ly discriminated in purely modal terms – but Higginbotham suggests that it 
is not at all clear that anything is thereby lost. 
However, the semantic issues in the context of speech and interpretation 
of speech come forward also in the context of belief, desire and the rest. 
Castañeda’s examples (see section 2.1 above) extend to our steady cognitive 
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states: so your desire to eat a hamburger may not be the same as your desire 
that x eat a hamburger, even if x=you. This leads Higginbotham to consider 
a problem with his view and others: speech is deliberate action, so that we 
can ask of a person’s reference to anything, how was it secured? But our 
doxastic, or epistemic, or desiderative states do not involve action at all. It 
follows, then, that if we are to take the first person in thought along the lines 
that he adumbrated for speech, we must conclude that many ordinary 
thoughts we have about ourselves must involve the capacity for thinking of 
ourselves as the possessors of these thoughts. But isn’t that too fancy? After 
all, we mammals do pretty well in general in thinking about ourselves (and 
we have no problem in saying that the dog wants to eat the hamburger). 
Higginbotham argues that Lewis’ account faces the same problem. 
Lewis proposed that a first-person belief involved the self-ascription of a 
property. For instance, if you know that you are sitting down in an ordinary 
way, then you self-ascribe the property of inhabiting a possible world where 
you are sitting down. Well, Higginbotham asks, when a dog wants a ham-
burger, does it thereby prefer to inhabit a world in which it gets a hamburg-
er? Higginbotham strives to make some progress on the problem raised by 
these questions. 
In her contribution to this volume, Kasia Jaszczolt notes that early dis-
cussions of de se belief ascription focused on the status of the objects of 
attitudes and stemmed out of consolidated attempts to exorcise propositions 
and introduce properties and ‘relations to oneself’ instead. Propositions 
were revindicated via various rescue plans but the problem of compositional 
semantics of belief reports, including de se attributions, has remained a test-
ing ground for semantic theories to this day. In her essay, Jaszczolt looks at 
de se belief reports in the light of the current debate between minimalism 
and contextualism in semantics. She argues that the differences in the refer-
ence-securing functions between de re and de se occur on the level of se-
mantic content itself where the latter has to be understood as on contextual-
ist accounts. The contextualist orientation is required for the essential ingre-
dient of self-awareness to be included in the semantic representation. This 
representation, on Jaszczolt’s account, is regarded as compositional in the 
contextualist sense of compositionality of meaning. In the course of her 
discussion Jaszczolt proposes some amendments to Chierchia’s (1989) 
claim of the systematicity of retrieval of the cognitive access to oneself 
from the types of grammatical expressions, and discusses the different roles 
that the concepts of self-ascription, self-attribution, and self-awareness play 
in a contextualist semantic theory of de se belief reports. 
Expression of self-awareness does not require a specific grammatical 
marker in English such as ‘I’ in oratio recta or (coreferential) ‘(s)he’ in 
oratio obliqua, neither do such expressions come with guaranteed expres-
sion of self-awareness. There does not seem to be a lexical or grammatical 
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‘peg’ on which to hang the property of expressing self-awareness. On 
Jaszczolt’s view, sometimes the property is externalized through the gram-
mar, at other times by default interpretations of this grammatical form, and 
at yet others by pragmatic resolution of the genuinely underspecified repre-
sentation. The contextualist framework and pragmatic compositionality 
embraced by Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, 2010) allow for this diver-
sity. 
In his contribution, Neil Feit develops an account of the truth conditions 
and propositions expressed by cognitive attitude reports, with a focus on 
belief reports in particular. Feit’s account makes use of the property theory 
of mental content, which denies the traditional view that the contents of our 
beliefs and other attitudes are propositions. Instead, the property theory 
takes such contents to be properties, that is, entities without truth values that 
are constant across persons and other objects, places, and times. The proper-
ty theory is built for de se belief. For example, if Feit believes that he him-
self is a philosopher, the content of his belief is simply the property of being 
a philosopher. On this account, there is no de se element in the content of 
the belief. What makes the belief de se is a matter of the attitude itself and 
not its content. The attitude is self-ascription, and it is in virtue of self-
ascribing the property of being a philosopher that Feit’s belief is de se. To 
self-ascribe a property is, roughly, to reflexively believe-oneself-to-have 
that property. 
The first section of Feit’s essay has to do with de se belief reports, the 
second with belief reports that contain embedded proper names or natural 
kind terms, and the third with what might be described as reports of purely 
de dicto belief. In the fourth section, Feit suggests some ideas for unifying 
the accounts offered in the first three sections, and turns to the logical form 
of belief reports and the sort of proposition they express. The result is a con-
textualist account according to which that-clauses merely characterize (ra-
ther than specify) belief content, but on which their semantic contents enter 
into logical form along with contextually-supplied information about how 
the subject is related to certain salient semantic values. 
As the existence of this volume and most of its essays indicate, the re-
ceived wisdom is that de se thoughts and their ascriptions are particularly 
problematic. In his contribution, however, Michael Devitt argues that this is 
a myth, an artifact of misguided philosophical approaches to the mind and 
semantics, particularly the positing of Platonic propositions. A theory of 
thoughts and a theory of their ascriptions, Devitt argues, must be related. 
Appealing to Quinean naturalism and Occam, he argues for the explanatory 
priority of the theory of thoughts. Assuming the Representational Theory of 
the Mind, he takes mental representations, not propositions, to be the “ob-
jects of thoughts”. From this basis, he offers suggestions about thoughts in 
standard and “puzzle” situations: Kripke’s Paderewski, Richard’s phone 
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booth, and the de se. These suggestions are far from a complete theory of 
thoughts, Devitt concedes, but he stresses that they are sufficient to show 
that there is nothing particularly problematic about de se thoughts.  
In light of this, Devitt considers ascriptions of thoughts. He concludes 
that there is nothing particularly problematic about the ascription of de se 
thoughts either. Throughout his essay, he emphasizes that both languages 
and minds are parts of the natural world, interacting causally with other 
parts of that world. Devitt argues that it is hard to see how Platonic proposi-
tions, the root of the myth, could be a part of that world. In any case, he 
finds no need to posit them. 
In their contribution to this volume, Denis Delfitto and Gaetano Fiorin 
argue for a certain sort of descriptive account of indexicals. They note that 
in the tradition initiated by Kaplan, two main claims are associated with 
indexicality: (i) indexicals cannot be treated as concealed descriptions (‘I’ is 
not equivalent to ‘the speaker in the context of utterance’, or any other 
suitable description) and (ii) indexicals are referentially rigid (in the sense 
that they refer to the same object in all possible worlds). It follows from 
these two facts that the subjective meaning of indexicals cannot be ex-
pressed propositionally: the sentences ‘his pants are on fire’ and ‘my pants 
are on fire’ express the very same singular proposition as long as ‘I’ and 
‘he’ refer to the same object. The case against a descriptive analysis of in-
dexicals is that, if indexicals were treated as descriptions, the sentence ‘If I 
were not speaking, then p’ would be predicted to be truth-conditionally 
equivalent to the sentence ‘If the speaker were not speaking, p’, contrary to 
facts. 
According to Delfitto and Fiorin, however, the price to pay for aban-
doning the descriptive analysis of indexicals is high. Meaning is no longer 
propositional in nature, in the sense that sentences containing indexicals 
cannot be reduced to functions from worlds to truth-values. They argue that 
indexicals can be treated as descriptions as long as their descriptive content 
is treated presuppositionally. As a consequence, the informativeness of in-
dexical sentences can be expressed in terms of (partial) propositions. They 
go on argue that indexical presuppositions are special in that their scope is 
constrained by independently motivated syntactic factors. The main result 
of their proposal is an account of shifted indexicals. It has been shown that, 
in a number of languages, the first person pronoun in an indirect report such 
as ‘John said that I am a hero’ can be interpreted as referring to the subject 
of the reported speech act and that, on such a reading, the report is unam-
biguously de se. On their approach, the de se interpretation of shifted index-
icals is the result of a syntax-driven process of “local” resolution of the pre-
supposition of ‘I’, which forces the descriptive content of ‘I’ to remain 
within the scope of the verb of speech. Finally, they extend the presupposi-
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tional analysis of indexical terms to definite descriptions and show that it 
accounts for attitudes de re in general. 
Yan Huang, in his contribution, considers the pragmatics of attributions 
of de se beliefs from a third-person point of view. As we have seen above, 
Castañeda created an artificial pronoun he*/she*/it* to encode the 
attribution of a de se belief from a third-person perspective. He called this 
artificial pronoun a ‘quasi-indicator’ and claimed that it is the only device 
that allows the marking of de se belief from a third-person viewpoint. 
Huang’s essay has two goals. First, he examines two types of linguistic 
expressions: (i) logophoric expressions in West African languages, and (ii) 
long-distance reflexives in East, South, and Southeast Asian languages, 
showing that both can function as quasi-indicators in Castañeda’s sense. 
Second, given that quasi-indicators are largely a pragmatic phenomenon, 
Huang provides a formal pragmatic analysis of the marking of de se 
attribution by logophoric expressions in West African languages and long-
distance reflexives in East, South, and Southeast Asian languages (and the 
related use of regular expressions/pronouns in these languages) in terms of 
the version of the neo-Gricean pragmatic theory of anaphora developed by 
Huang, using the three general pragmatic principles proposed by Levinson 
(2000), namely the Q-, I- and M-principles.  
In his contribution, Eros Corazza begins by discussing some linguistic 
data favoring the de re / de se distinction. In so doing he focuses on the dif-
ferent way epithets (e.g., ‘the bastard’, ‘the imbecile’) and quasi-indicators 
(e.g., ‘s/he her/himself’) behave when they appear in psychological charac-
terizations. He argues that they often work like attributive anaphors. The 
quasi-indicator ‘she herself’ in ‘Jane1 believes that she (herself)1 is rich’ 
inherits its value from ‘Jane’ and attributes an ‘I’-thought to Jane. The epi-
thet ‘the bastard’ in ‘Jane planned to marry Jon1, but the bastard1 ran away’ 
also inherits its value from ‘Jon’ and attributes the property of being a bas-
tard to Jon. Corazza shows how the ungrammaticality of sentences like 
‘*Jon1 claimed/ said/ thinks/… that the bastard1 was honest’) does not 
threaten the view that epithets can be understood as anaphoric pronouns. 
Their ungrammaticality rests on the fact that the epithet is embedded in 
what should be a de se attribution (e.g. ‘Jon1 claimed/ said/ thinks/… that he 
(himself)1 was honest’) while its nature is to contribute to the expression of 
a de re attribution. This also helps to understand the ungrammaticality of 
‘*Jane1 said/ thinks/ promised/… that the imbecile1 will come’ vs. the 
grammaticality of ‘Jane1 said/ thinks/ promised/… that she (herself)1 will 
come’ on the one hand, and the ungrammaticality of ‘*Jon1 ran over a man 
who was trying to give him (himself)1 directions’ vs. the grammaticality of 
‘Jon1 ran over a man who was trying to give the idiot1 directions’ on the 
other hand.  
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These linguistic data, on Corazza’s view, can be accounted for by refer-
ring to discourse consideration involving the notions of point of view, per-
spective and empathy. He argues that empathy is central to the distinction 
between de se and de re construals, and that the difference in behavior be-
tween an epithet and a quasi-indicator is best accounted for by focusing on 
such a notion. When the reporter empathizes with the attributee s/he is un-
likely to use an epithet in characterizing the attributee. Empathy is also im-
portant to Corazza’s defense of the view that in a psychological characteri-
zation an epithet forces the de re reading, while a quasi-indicator triggers 
the de se one. 
Finally, in his contribution, Alessandro Capone discusses various philo-
sophical theories of de se attitudes and explores a bifurcation of the ideas of 
two major theorists on them. He defends the idea that the ego-concept is an 
essential element of de se thoughts. Furthermore, Capone defends the claim 
that pragmatic intrusion is involved in de se constructions: the ego-concept 
being a component of the de se thought. He defends this idea from a number 
of objections. He then explores the related notion of immunity to error 
through misidentification, and argues that this too depends on pragmatic 
intrusion. After defending this view from obvious objections, Capone ar-
rives at the conclusion that immunity to error through misidentification is 
both an epistemological and a semantic phenomenon, and also that its se-
mantics has interesting epistemological implications. 
3.2 Part Two: Epistemology and Metaphysics 
In his contribution, Igor Douven begins with the observation that the dis-
tinction between beliefs held about oneself de se, and beliefs held about 
oneself merely de re, has led some theorists to abandon the traditional con-
ception of propositions as sets of possible worlds, and has led others to deny 
that belief is a two-place relation between a subject and a proposition. Like 
Devitt, Douven argues that de se beliefs do not pose any special problems 
with respect to theorizing about cognitive attitudes. Unlike Devitt, however, 
Douven suggests that we can account for de se attitudes within the tradi-
tional framework of propositions. Douven argues that the de se / de re dis-
tinction warrants revision neither of the concept of proposition nor of that of 
belief, and that the distinction can be fully captured in terms of differences 
in the kinds of evidence needed to warrant reports of the distinct types of 
belief. On Douven’s account, the distinction between de se attitudes and 
those that are merely de re depends on the justification conditions that at-
tach to certain attitude-ascribing propositions. 
In his contribution, Darren Bradley argues along several lines that be-
liefs can be characterized in one way that allows their truth values to change 
over time, and in another way that does not. Suppose for example that you 
previously believed it was Sunday, and now believe it is Monday. What are 
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the implications of this truism for the philosophy of mind, and in particular, 
for the question of whether beliefs have eternal truth-values? Eternalists 
hold that beliefs have eternal truth values, temporalists hold that they do not 
(Bradley calls both of these one-dimensional theories). On the other hand, 
two-dimensionalists (e.g., Perry 1979, Chalmers 2002) hold that we need 
not choose – beliefs have both eternal and temporal components. Bradley 
defends two-dimensionalism over one-dimensionalism, and specifically, 
over temporalism.  
Two-dimensionalism is a more complex and less unified theory, and as 
a result the burden is on the two-dimensionalist to show that the extra com-
plexity is worth the cost. Bradley argues that two-dimensionalism buys us 
an ontology of dynamic beliefs. These are beliefs that survive as time pass-
es, even though their linguistic expression might change. This allows us to 
say that the earlier belief that it is Sunday, and the later belief that it was 
Sunday, are the very same belief. Two-dimensionalism offers a less unified 
theory, but it offers more unified beliefs, and Bradley argues that these uni-
fied beliefs are needed to give a natural account of belief retention.  
Bradley appeals to certain tensions within Frege’s writings, as he strug-
gled to find a single object of belief that played all the roles beliefs are sup-
posed to play. He defends two-dimensionalism from a criticism that can be 
extrapolated from Lewis (1980b). Finally, he argues that two-
dimensionalism is independently motivated by considerations from confir-
mation theory – the two dimensions correspond to two rules of belief update 
– and so he argues that this is a case where epistemology informs philoso-
phy of mind. 
Michael Titelbaum, in his contribution, argues that while de se degrees 
of belief create special problems for traditional Bayesian updating, these 
problems can be resolved without first committing to a particular theory of 
de se content. He does this by outlining a new credence-updating scheme 
that, instead of working directly with the contents of an agent’s doxastic 
attitudes, works with the agent’s willingness to affirm linguistic sentences 
in contexts. This approach utilizes an element (truth-values of linguistic 
sentences in contexts) common to all theories of de se content. Crucial to 
Titelbaum’s strategy is a new, epistemic notion of context-sensitivity. He 
argues that epistemically context-sensitive sentences are the ones that cause 
trouble for traditional Bayesian Conditionalization.  
Having identified the troublemakers for the traditional Bayesian updat-
ing rule, Titelbaum describes a new updating scheme that solves various 
decision-theoretic conundrums like the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Finally, 
Titelbaum suggests that although he has made no assumptions about the 
theory of content in constructing his updating scheme, the answers that 
scheme gives to problems like the Sleeping Beauty Problem may leave 
some theories of content looking more plausible than others.  In particular, 
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there may be trouble for Lewisian theories on which ‘I’m awake today’ has 
the same content on Tuesday as it does on Monday.  
In his contribution, Pietro Perconti argues that first-person beliefs have 
an essentially indexical nature, and moreover that only such beliefs can 
have a genuine motivational force in our behavior. Perconti distinguishes 
the motivational power that a given belief might have, and its causal role in 
behaviour. He goes on to argue that the motivational power of a belief is, in 
a certain way, a linguistic state of affairs.  
If we take into account justifications people have for their actions, ac-
cording to Perconti, we can see that only first-person beliefs are endowed 
with motivational force. In order to achieve this power, all the other kinds 
of beliefs must be transformed into first-person beliefs. The reference of 
first-person beliefs depends on a specific mode of presentation of first-
person bodily perspective, which is specifically realized in the human brain. 
On Perconti’s view, the brain represents the body in a direct and specific 
way, without any attribution of a property to oneself or the mastery of a 
self-concept. The word ‘I’ and similar “pure” indexicals are taken to be the 
linguistic counterparts of the cognitive processes that the human brain uses 
to shape bodily self-representation. 
Michael Nelson, in his contribution, argues for a relativist account of 
temporal thought and a contextualist account of first-personal thought. 
Time, on this sort of view, serves as an index of truth. One thinks the same 
thought yesterday that one thinks today in saying to oneself, ‘It is Monday’. 
That same thought is true at the date that is yesterday and false at the date 
that is today. A proposition is true or false at a time, and can have different 
truth values at different times. Person, on the other hand, enters into the 
content of the proposition thought. Susan and Sally think different thoughts 
when each says to herself, ‘I am hungry’, Susan thinking a thought about 
herself and Sally a thought about herself. These propositions are then true or 
false indifferently across different people. On Nelson’s view, time serves as 
a parameter of truth, but persons do not.  
Nelson argues that the existent linguistic and psychological arguments 
for and against contextualist and relativist accounts are unpersuasive. He 
then argues that there are metaphysical reasons for thinking that the consti-
tution of reality is time relative, but person absolute. A fact obtains, Nelson 
argues, at a time but not at a person. The truth and falsity of propositions 
should mirror the obtaining of facts. So, he concludes, propositional truth is 
time but not person relative. 
In the final contribution, John Perry uses self-locating beliefs to argue 
against a simple account of belief, according to which belief consists merely 
in an agent at a time believing a proposition. Perry argues that a more com-
plex view makes better sense of self-locating beliefs among other phenom-
ena. On this view, a belief is an internal mental representation – a particular 
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structure of ideas in the mind – with a certain proposition as its content but 
also with truth-conditions that are distinct from those of the proposition.  
A belief is self-locating provided that its truth constrains the location or 
features of the believer. On Perry’s version of the complex view, certain 
ideas of objects – called notions – are sensitive to information about those 
objects and the roles they play in our cognitive lives. This helps to explain 
the self-locating nature of the beliefs of which these notions are a part. In 
the case of de se belief, our self-notions are sensitive to information about 
ourselves in a way that accounts for the sort of belief about oneself that or-
dinary self-knowledge requires. Perry argues that one cannot have a belief 
of this sort without a role-based idea of oneself (i.e., a self-notion). This 
serves as the basis for an objection to the Lewisian view, on which a self-
notion need not be part of a de se belief. 
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